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Introduction
Currently transparency seems to be a buzzword in the global anticorrup-tion discourse. Pollitt and Hupe (2011) would call transparency a “mag-
ic concept”, a very broad, normatively-charged concept which lays claim to 
universal application and it is widely used by both academics and practi-
tioners. The latter, however, should not be seduced into thinking that the 
fashionable concept of transparency provides usable recipes for strength-
ening accountability, reducing corruption and enhancing good governance 
in a specific context (Bauhr and Grimes 2017). Effective disclosure of in-
formation has not been a demonstrated achievement of the transparency 
rhetoric in many contexts, not by necessity it has strengthened the citizens’ 
capacity to act upon the available information (Lindstedt and Naurin 2010). 
The “transparency fix” builds on the powerful metaphor of the sunlight that 
perforate government secrecy to act as a disinfectant thanks to the flow of 
information from the state. Yet, this metaphor gives a misleading picture of 
the significance of transparency for good governance since it rises above the 
institutional and societal preconditions that shape whether the release of 
government information delivers the expected benefits (Fenster 2017). 
Drawing on the literature on transparency and anticorruption, this con-
tribution seeks to advance policy recommendations that might be included 
into a reform agenda. In order to qualify the claims of the global transpar-
ency discourse, section one presents the barriers for information disclosure 
and use. Then, section two provides an overview of the myths that are at the 
heart of the transparency rhetoric. The contradictions concealed by trans-
parency myths are addressed by a set of policy recommendations outlined 
in section three. The conclusive section discusses broader practical implica-
tions of the fine-grained assessment of contextual conditions that are over-
looked by simplistic and idealized views of transparency. 
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Before moving to the next section, it is worth noticing that transparen-
cy is articulated in a number of varieties of information disclosure, from 
reactive forms like freedom of information to proactive forms like open 
data. Each variety of transparency poses opportunities and challenges for 
anticorruption (Cordis and Warren 2014; Costa 2013; Garcia Aceves 2016; 
Granickas 2014; Vadlammanati and Cooray 2016; Worthy and McLean 
2015). The exploration of the relationship between anticorruption and va-
rieties of transparency is beyond the scope of this contribution. The latter 
focuses on policy recommendations that are set at a high level of abstraction 
transcending the nuances of different forms of transparency. This means 
building on a finding shared by previous research on varieties of transpar-
ency: whatever the form of disclosure is undertaken, its effectiveness as an 
anticorruption tool is strictly dependent on contextual enabling conditions 
(Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadasov 2017).
 
1. Barriers for the disclosure and use of government information
This section first contributes to the conceptualization of barriers on in-
formation disclosure and derive practical implications concerning resistance 
from public servants to implement transparency laws. Drawing on recent 
literature, three key strains of resistance towards transparency can be identi-
fied (Barry and Bannister 2014; Conradie and Choenni 2014; Michener and 
Ritter 2017; Wirtz et al. 2016). The barriers identified below are often inter-
related and this interrelatedness further lowers the chance of information 
disclosure by public bureaucracies.
• Professional resistance
The risk-averse attitude of the public servants builds an important 
barrier to implementing transparency provisions. It is well known that 
employees in the public sector are likely to display low willingness to 
implement reform in the context of an organizational culture which is 
conservative about the release of government information. Moreover, 
the predominance of negative frames in the current news media envi-
ronment hardens the resistance of public servants since government 
information is mainly used to assign blame rather than to improve the 
daily work of public bodies, thus increasing mistrust in government 
(Grimmelikhuijsen 2012). 
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• Resistance as an indirect effect of limited capacities
Government information does not exist as an object capable of simple 
release since it does not form a manageable archive (Fenster 2006). 
There are a number of barriers resulting from shortage of capacity to 
produce, archive, and disclose information of good quality, ranging 
from the unavailability of a supporting technological infrastructure to 
the lack of personnel, standards and procedures, complemented by 
the legacy of fragmented records. Further, this resistance often reflects 
a much larger difficulty: the lack of top-level leadership and planning. 
• Legal resistance
Public employees tend to perceive the existing transparency regula-
tions to be under-specified since they do not provide clear instruc-
tions on how to handle the potential for controversies surrounding 
the protection of personal data, security issues and licensing. The lack 
of clear legislation thus leads to an inhibited attitude regarding trans-
parency in the perception of public employees with fear of conflict 
with the law. 
With regard to the use of information, the existence of a public that 
stands in as the receiver of data and documents released by govern-
ment has been contested by recent literature (Roberts 2010). One 
of the most substantial barrier is simply the lack of awareness about 
rights granted by transparency laws, particularly among the least edu-
cated citizens. For individuals who display awareness of transparency 
legislation, there a number of practical difficulties: lack of advice on 
how to file a request for information or a complaint about non-com-
pliance with transparency laws; lack of information on the location 
of information that has been proactively released; lack of all kinds of 
resources and skills that are needed for the analysis and the interpreta-
tion of government information. To make sense of government infor-
mation, in fact, data and documents must be collected, combined and 
integrated with contextual information in order to infer actionable 
knowledge with regard to the public sector’s trends and anomalies. 
2. Myths of Transparency
Drawing on the review of the barriers for the release and the use of gov-
ernment information that have been highlighted by the literature, Janssen 
et al. (2012) have identified five myths which have proved be at the heart of 
open government implementation in most countries so far:
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• Information disclosure will automatically yield benefits
The aim of open government should not be merely the release of in-
formation for its own sake. This myth overlooks the barriers resulting 
in a lack of user actions. Placing too much emphasis on the supply 
of information and not providing any means to process information 
makes transparency useless. Supporting use of information should 
not be conceived as secondary to releasing information.
• All information should be unrestrictively disclosed
Transparency policies are often generic and stimulate the release of 
all information following the principle of full accessibility. This myth 
overlooks a number of issues. First, law might prevent the release of 
certain data. Second, resources for disclosing information are limit-
ed. Third, resource scarcity is further heightened in the eye of public 
servants by the perception of transparency as an extra task without 
a clear return since the benefits of disclosure are not always explicit. 
Fourth, information quality varies across records and datasets and in 
many instances it could be too low. Finally, the implementation of this 
myth can turn into a “snowing” effect, in which the release of so much 
data with so little interpretation and quality control has the effect of 
reducing rather than increasing effective use (Hood 2007).
• It is a matter of simply releasing government information
Many transparency policies adopt the model that takes formerly closed 
information and exposes it through a publicly accessible interface. 
Basically, information is made available without additional activities. 
However, additional activities are needed to improve records manage-
ment (Casadesus de Mingo and Cerrillo i Martinez 2018). Additional 
activities are also needed to lower the barriers for accessing and using 
government information by meeting the two key empirical parame-
ters of transparency: visibility and inferability (Michener and Bersch 
2013). First, standardization of release methods and development of 
robust meta-data can improve visibility of information by making it 
complete and easy to locate. Second, transparency is more attractive 
for users if information is verified and simplified by third parties that 
check the accuracy of datasets and detect patterns meaningful for the 
public. 
• Every citizens can make use of government information
Reformers often claim that transparency will enable the wider public 
to hold government to account. However, the experience of coun-
tries like the UK has highlighted that non-experienced citizens do 
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not constitute an army of “armchair auditors” looking over the books 
(Worthy 2015). Despite the rhetoric of reformers, the bulk of ordi-
nary citizens is not interested in government information. Disclosure 
affects only a small core of users, mixing activists and professionals, 
meaning that transparency tends to be used by those already engaged 
in the policymaking process who are willing and able to handle the 
complexity of government information (Worthy and Hazell 2017).
• Transparency will result in open government
The Open Government movement promotes transparency to deli-
ver objectives like improved decision-making, better public under-
standing, more effective oversight, greater public participation and 
increased trust. Yet, the empirical analysis has highlighted that an in-
crease in transparency in highly corrupt countries yields paradoxical-
ly more losses than gains in confidence towards government (Bauhr 
and Grimes 2014). These findings challenge the assumptions of open 
government rhetoric posing a direct link between transparency and 
better government institutions. Transparency reforms alone cannot 
be expected to ignite broad social indignation towards corruption. 
Transparency may instead give rise to resignation and withdrawal 
from public life as unintended effects. Only if accompanied by other 
institutional arrangements that channel public discontent with malfea-
sance exposed by disclosure, transparency can bring about improve-
ments in governance (Vadlammati and Cooray 2017). Complementary 
institutional arrangements should focus on two key issues: participa-
tory mechanisms that lower the costs of political engagement; relia-
ble inter-institutional oversight mechanisms providing an avenue by 
which to utilize information to issue sanctions. 
3. Policy Recommendations
Given the success of the myths identified in the previous section, it seems 
that a more nuanced approach is needed for effective information disclo-
sure, meaning a transparency policy capable of reaching the goals that are 
included in the open government agenda. In this section five practical steps 
are recommended to go beyond the current state of the art featuring a wid-
ening gap between the promises of transparency and the limited use of gov-
ernment information.
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• Demand-driven transparency
Transparency should be understood as a focused policy that devotes 
limited resources to the release of useful information. This implies 
that government information should be mapped in order to provide 
users with a clear data catalogue providing information with regard 
to data quality and to the costs and the time needed to release in-
formation. More consultation with key stakeholders complemented 
by research into the users’ perspective is also needed to undertake 
the focused approach to information disclosure that prioritizes the 
release of information demanded by users. In addition, promotional 
or other forms of supportive activity (events, contests, conferences, 
civic monitoring, etc.) should encourage the use of disclosed informa-
tion. Finally, more data should be collected with regard to the users’ 
feedback and the actual social and economic impact of transparency 
(Sieber and Johson 2015). 
• Performance management
Drawing on users’ perspective to set transparency goals implemented 
is the first step to accommodate modern transparency initiatives with-
in traditional models of performance management design. The latter 
provides factors like measurability, that is distinguishing specific are-
as of action and matching them with specific outcomes; performance 
milestones to track progress and evaluate results; and goal clarity sus-
taining better communication and coordination. All these factors sup-
port the implementation of the focused approach catalyzing the shift 
from transparency as a collection of disparate policy practices into a 
coherent administrative reform area (Ingrams 2017).
• Lateral transparency
Transparency policies have been path-dependent so far, meaning that 
the legacy of vertical data management has been reproduced by laws 
mandating the release of information by public agencies conceived as 
monads. Yet, public agencies are usual part of larger organizational 
structures implying that transparency can also flow laterally between 
peer organizations sharing data (Piotrowski 2017). Lateral transpar-
ency yields immediate benefits for public servants by enabling better 
inter-organizational collaboration. Further, it makes feasible the es-
tablishment of data analytics units at the centre of government that 
help agencies detect possible misuse of public resources as well as 
contributing to institutionalize evidence-based decision-making.
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• Enforcement
It is widely acknowledged that enforcement of transparency provisions 
is key to mitigating implementation gaps. The courts and oversight bo-
dies are the two main enforcement mechanisms built into transparen-
cy laws. Many systems entrust oversight bodies with a primary role by 
resolving disputes that arise between users and the administration that 
holds government information. Most scholars demand oversight bodies 
endowed with strong enforcement powers including the right to issue 
legally binding orders. However, comparative research has shown that 
oversight bodies with binding decision power are not necessarily more 
effective than their counterparts with recommendation power (Holsen 
and Pasquier 2015). There are drawbacks to more coercive powers: 
first, oversight bodies with binding decision power require substantial 
investment of resources; second, qualified candidates for filling the po-
sition of transparency officers within each administration are discoura-
ged from looking for the assignment which pose the risk of sanctions 
in case of non-compliance; third, granting the oversight body binding 
decision power would be too drastic a step forcing information disclo-
sure by legalistic means. The latter are likely to reinforce public serv-
ants’ resistance towards transparency, thus making implementation a 
matter of legal interpretation that risks triggering disruptive conflict 
between public bodies, requesters of information and oversight struc-
tures. To make it short, strong enforcement powers may appear as 
a quick fix for implementation problems but they overlook the evo-
lutionary nature of transparency reform (Snell 2000). The latter is a 
process that should be accompanied by oversight bodies focused on 
regulatory and monitoring roles that help build capacity over time. 
It is also worth highlighting the relevance of appointment process-
es: information commissioners may well ensure effective enforcement 
by using the informal power to shame non-compliant administrative 
offices that rests on their strategic ability to develop and consolidate 
awareness and public support for transparency reform. 
• Transparency Ecosystem
It is now widely acknowledged that transparency has functioned as an 
effective check only in those contexts where it has been part of an eco-
logy that includes sound public management, independent judiciary, 
reasonably open opportunities to publish and share information, and 
a set of civil society actors capable of pursuing anticorruption campai-
gns (Kreimer 2008). This implies that transparency should be designed 
and evaluated by undertaking an holistic approach that targets not only 
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the disclosure of information but also the interdependencies between 
actors as suggested by the ecological metaphor. The latter highlights 
the multiple and varying interrelationships between data producers, 
users, material infrastructures, and institutions. It aims to provoke 
new thinking about the conditions necessary to actively cultivate de-
velopment of contextual features to achieve the benefits of transpa-
rency (Harrison, Pardo and Cook 2012). First, it means that transpa-
rency should not been disentangled by broader public management 
reform since the capacity of public agencies is a necessary condition 
for good record-keeping and effective disclosure. Second, regulation 
should ensure that markets provide opportunities for media pluralism 
and innovative business. Third, education should equip new genera-
tion with a viable level of data literacy. 
Conclusions
Drawing on the expanding literature on anticorruption and open govern-
ment, this contribution has tackled the gap between the benefits promised 
by the transparency rhetoric and the limited success of most reform initia-
tives that have been implemented so far. It has identified the main resistanc-
es to information disclosure that are neglected by the myths widely used as 
tales of progress associated to the current talk on transparency. 
Placing transparency within an empirically-grounded perspective is the 
main policy recommendation that can be advanced in this conclusive sec-
tion. This implies taking into account the many barriers that hinder the 
implementation of transparency by virtue of a focused approach, meaning 
an incremental and selective take on implementation that draws on a fine-
grained assessment of contextual features. It also means focusing on capac-
ity building issue not only within the public sector but also across those 
societal actors that are part of the ecology of transparency. 
Another set of policy recommendations concern the relationship between 
transparency and accountability. First, complementary institutional arrange-
ments like participatory mechanisms and interinstitutional oversight mech-
anisms are needed to sustain civic mindedness and propensity to engage in 
accountability efforts. Second, transparency and complementary institution-
al arrangements should attempt to encourage improved institutional perfor-
mance rather than focusing on individual failures and transgressions. Most 
of the current anticorruption drive in corruption-prone countries suffers 
from legalism and capacity shortage resulting from the focus on individual 
331
Part X. Public transparency and the prevention of corruption
accountability (Fox 2007). By focusing on the details of the micro-manage-
ment of public resources this approach to accountability overlooks more 
systemic flaws that pose the opportunity structure for corrupt behavior. A 
proper preventive approach on corruption should focus more on providing 
societal actors with the information that is needed to monitor a larger pic-
ture of government.
Finally, the crucial role for specialized bodies in the regulation and en-
forcement of transparency should not been understood as a replacement of 
political commitment. The latter is needed for setting a robust legal frame-
work and funding transparency initiatives within a coherent and compre-
hensive national strategy that provides a clear direction to the entire govern-
ment ensuring coordination and communication of the progress towards the 
measurable objectives agreed with stakeholders. Effective management of 
the national strategy therefore requires setting up responsibilities and capac-
ities at the centre of government that are much needed to promote a shared 
vision across the public sector and towards the citizens. 
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